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REGULATION OF HOURS OF FLIGHT:
A FEDERAL ISSUE?
Since the advent of jet aircraft, more and more people have sought
redress through the courts for damages from airplane noise. From one
of these cases comes the rule that if an airport is owned by a munici-
pality, the municipality is the proper defendant for an action even
though the aircraft are privately owned.' Perhaps in anticipation of
this liability and in response to increasing public pressure, munici-
palities are seeking effective means of preventing aircraft noise from
disturbing their citizens.
The city of Santa Monica, California, the owner of the local airport,
passed an ordinance prohibiting the take-off of jet aircraft between
the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.2 Stagg, a jet pilot, violated the
ordinance, and an action was filed against him by the city. Stagg con-
tended that the ordinance was preempted by state and federal law
and, therefore, invalid. But, in Stagg v. Municipal Court of Santa
Monica,3 the California Court of Appeals found that there was no
preemption by either state or federal law and that the ordinance was
a valid exercise of municipal police power.
In reaching its decision, the Stagg court relied heavily on the test for
federal preemption set forth in Loma Portal Civic Club v. American
Airlines, Inc." The Loma Portal court stated the test to be "whether
the enforcement of state law would conflict with the purposes of the
federal legislation, whether by frustrating an affirmative federal pur-
pose or by interfering with a matter intentionally left unregulated by
Congress."5 Interpreting this, the Stagg court dismissed the federal is-
1. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
2. The Santa Monica Municipal Code provides:
No pure jet aircraft shall take off from the airport between the hours of 11:00
o'clock p.m. of one day and 7:00 a.m. the next day. The Airport Director or
in his absence the watch commander of the Santa Monica Police Department
may approve a take-off during said hours, provided it appears to his satisfac-
tion that an emergency involving life or death exists and approval is obtained
before take-off.
Stagg v. Municipal Court of Santa Monica, 2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 319, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 578, 579 (1969).
3. 2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1969).
4. 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964).
5. Id. at 591, 394 P.2d at 554, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
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sue and concluded that "state action (and impliedly that of a political
subdivision thereof) has not been precluded by any extensive pattern
of federal regulation in the field of air transportation."a This con-
clusion, while acknowledging the Loma Portal court's refusal to recog-
nize federal preemption, is inconsistent with that court's decision not
to enjoin flight operations at a public airport at the request of a
property owner in the neighborhood of the airport. The Loma Portal
court based its decision on the ground that it is clearly against the
policy of California for its courts to interfere with airport flight pat-
terns established by federal regulation.
The holding in Stagg, based as it is on the test of legislative intent
announced in Loma Portal, should have led the Stagg court to inquire
whether the ordinance conflicts with valid, applicable federal legis-
lation. In Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst,7 an ordinance
prohibiting air flight over the Village of Cedarhurst was held to be a
regulation of federally established flight paths and, therefore, in direct
conflict with the federal regulatory scheme. And in American Air-
lines, Inc., v. Town of Hempstead s the court enjoined the enforcement
of Hempstead's "Unnecessary Noise Ordinance" which prohibited
the operation of any machine in the town creating noise above a cer-
tain level. Because that level was below that created by aircraft flying
over Hempstead from Kennedy International Airport, the court found
that the ordinance necessarily regulated flight paths. If the Stagg
court had considered the nature of the particular aviation activity
affected by the Santa Monica ordinance and had found federal regu-
lation of that activity in the form of flight patterns and procedures,
then Allegheny, American, and Loma Portal would have been strong
authority for finding federal preemption and holding the Santa
Monica ordinance invalid.
Another federal issue, implicit in almost any consideration of fed-
eral preemption, is whether the ordinance constitutes an undue bur-
den on interstate commerce. Again, an inquiry into the nature of
airport operations affected by the ordinance would have disclosed the
commercial or non-commercial character of the airport. If commercial
flights had been obstructed by the ordinance, the prohibition on night
take-offs should be invalidated because the national interest in con-
6. 2 Cal. App. 3d at 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
7. 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
8. 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
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tinuing such operations under the commerce clause would certainly
be paramount to the local interest in decreasing the resultant noise.9
If all or even most of the nation's municipalities were to adopt ordi-
nances similar to the Santa Monica ordinance, the practical conse-
quence would be an over-burdening of facilities barely adequate to
handle the load presently thrust upon them. It is inconceivable that
the resultant burden on interstate commerce could in any way be
classified as tolerable.
But, perhaps the Stagg court would have found the operations of
the airport to be purely private in nature. It has been argued that
the constitutionally-permissible scope of local regulation should not
be so limited in the case of small, local, non-commercial airports, 0
and there are cases where injunctions have been granted.- But some
courts have recognized a public interest in continued operations even
when the airport is entirely private. 2
The Stagg court's casual dismissal of the federal preemption issue
ignores the fact that air transportation is one of the fields most ex-
tensively regulated by the federal government. This regulation, first
enacted in 1926,13 has been extended more and more over the years. 4
Courts have acknowledged the fact that federal control has intensi-
fied,"s and many of them have specifically announced federal preemp-
tion of the field? 6 More specifically, in 1968, Congress passed a law
providing for the control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic
boom,17 stating that:
9. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
10. Harvey, Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HA.
L. REV. 1581, 1592 (1961).
11. See Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 497 (1952).
12. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752 (1947).
13. Air Commerce Act of 1926, 49 U.S.C. § 171.
14. The history of interstate commerce in general, and of air commerce in
particular, is traced in detail in Allegheny Airlines, Inc., v. Village of Cedarhurst,
238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
15. See, e.g., Northwest Air Lines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
16. See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc., v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812
(2d Cir. 1956), where the doctrine of federal preemption was stated very broadly.
But the ordinance in question was enacted as a safety measure, so actually the
Cedarhurst case must be limited as establishing that only state and local regulation
of air safety is preempted. See also City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, 159 F.
Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958), and American Airlines, Inc., v. Town of Hempstead,
272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1017 (1969), where the court, while relying on Cedarhurst, limited its
preemption holding to the facts and effect of the Hempstead ordinance.
17. 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1968).
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In order to afford present and future relief and protection to the
public from unnecessary aircraft noise and sonic boom, the Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration ... shall pre-
scribe and amend such rules and regulations as he may find nec-
essary to provide for the control and abatement of aircraft noise
and sonic boom .... 18
It may, then, be logically inferred that Congress intended that any
regulation of aircraft noise should emanate from the federal level.
This should not be taken to mean, however, that state and local
governments are completely powerless to assist in the effort to estab-
lish a sound approach to the problem of airport noise. Through the
implementation of land use controls, for which authority exists pri-
marily at the local level, local communities can undertake appropriate
planning and zoning as may be necessary to make adjacent land areas
compatible to the use of the airport.
Unfortunately, "[a]dvanced planning alone will not solve the total
airport noise problem. In many communities, property rights will
have to be purchased and compensation awarded by the courts will
have to be paid .. -."19 where the aircraft noise constitutes an action-
able invasion of property.20 In addition, it would seem that minor
annoyances from air flights, such as infrequent low flying and other
occasional disturbances, are not sufficient justification for local govern-
ments' "invoking police powers and enacting legislation against the
flight of aircraft generally or in connection with the operation of
airports."21
It should be apparent that a national as well as a local interest
exists in a sound system of airports. Unfortunately, the Santa Monica
ordinance serves neither of these interests, and, were the logic of the
Stagg court extended nation-wide, it is difficult to imagine how an
effective system of air transportation could be maintained.22 Allow-
ing the airport-owning municipality to abate noise by regulation of
18. Id. § 1431 (a).
19. Dygert, An Economic Approach to Airport Noise, 30 J. Am. L. & Cota. 207(1964).
20. See Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394
P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964); Kuntz v. Werner Flying Service, 257 Wis.
405, 43 N.W.2d 476 (1950).
21. Eubank, Jurisdictional Control of Airflight, 39 MAUR. L. Rnv. 324, 329
(1956).
22. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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times for take-off has obvious consequences: rules would not be uni-
form from airport to airport, thereby disrupting service, and the
problem of changing time zones could present some global problems.
So, "while it is arguable that the local authorities possess the power
to make regulations controlling the hours of flight, it is unlikely that
they would long retain this power if its exercise were stringent."23
Richard J. Kahdeman
23. Berger, Nobody Loves an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 631, 722 (1970).
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